A structuralist model of the small open economy in the short, medium and long run by Hoon, Hian Teck & Phelps, Edmund S.
Columbia University 
Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
A Structuralist Model of the Small Open Economy in the 
Short, Medium and Long Run 
Hian Teck Hoon 
Edmund S. Phelps 
Discussion Paper #:0102-25 
Department of Economics 
Columbia University 
New York, NY 10027 
March 2002 
A Structuralist Model of the Small Open Economy in 
the Short, Medium and Long Run 
A b s t r a c t 
In open-economy macroeconomics there is a monetary model in the 
Keynesian tradition that is deemed serviceable for analyzing the short 
run and there is a nonmonetary neoclassical theory thought capable of 
handling the long run. But do the Keynesian and neoclassical models 
meet the challenges thrown out by the main events of the past few 
decades—the '80s shock to Europe taking the form of an external jump 
in real interest rates; the sort of shock experienced in the U.S. and 
parts of northern Europe in the second half of the '90s: the emerging 
prospect of new industries in the future creating increased needs for 
capital; and what may have been a major shock of the '60s: the large 
Kennedy tax cut, mostly the reduction in income taxes, enacted in 
the U.S. in 1964? We suggest that the effects of these shocks on the 
open economy are not well portrayed by either the standard Keynesian 
model or by standard neoclassical theory. We then provide a careful 
development of a nonmonetary model of the equilibrium path of the 
real exchange rate, and natural output, employment and interest based 
on trading frictions in the goods market, and compare its implications 
not only over the medium run but for the short run and the long run 
as well. (JEL E24; F3; F4) 
In open-economy macroeconomics there is a m o n e t a r y model in t he Key-
nesian t r ad i t ion t h a t is deemed serviceable for analyzing the shor t r u n (Rober t 
Mundel l , 1962, 1963; Rudiger Dornbusch 1980) a n d there is a nonmone-
1 
tary neoclassical theory thought capable of handling the long run (Olivier 
Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, 1989; Joao Ricardo Faria and Miguel Leon-
Ledesma, 2000).1 For years the weak point in this arsenal was agreed to be 
the medium run (Edmond Malinvaud, 1994, 1996). This run, which follows 
the short-run adjustment of production, hiring and training, advertising and 
other investment rates, is a period of adjustment for the various business as-
sets, such as customers and trained employees as well as plant, during which 
nationals' private wealth holdings and social entitlements are regarded as 
constant—a period we will think of as emerging in the second year follow-
ing a shock and running for half a decade or so. By now, several dynamic 
nonmonetary models of a "structuralist" possessing such a medium run have 
emerged (Edmund Phelps, 1988a, 1988b; Hian Teck Hoon and Phelps, 1992; 
Phelps, 1994; Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, 2000). At present, 
though, the structuralist models tend to be seen as niche products offering 
no competition to the established short-run and long-run models. 
But do the Keynesian and neoclassical models meet the challenges thrown 
out by the main events of the past few decades? We suggest that the effects 
of these shocks on the open economy are not well portrayed by either the 
standard Keynesian model or by standard neoclassical theory. Consider the 
1
 Carlos Rodriguez (1979), in addition to studying the short-run effects, also studies 
the long-run effects of monetary and fiscal policies in an open-economy Keynesian model 
under flexible exchange rates where the stock of foreign assets has fully adjusted to the 
stream of induced short-run international capital flows. This approach, however, suffers 
from the weakness that it assumes nominal wage or price-level stickiness even in the long 
run. 
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'80s shock to Europe: an external jump in real interest rates. The Mundell-
Fleming model and its descendants, applied to fluctuating-exchange-rate 
economies such as the US, EU and Japan, predict that a rise in the over-
seas interest rate interacts with the home country's supply of liquidity, or 
LM curve, to cause a release of liquidity fueling an increase of output and 
employment; in the usual extension, employment would gradually be forced 
back to its fixed natural level. Neoclassical theory would depict interaction 
of the interest rate increase with the supply of labor, which would (or could) 
cause an increase in the work week and possibly in the labor force. In fact, 
European employment went into a huge decline in the '80s and by 2000, 
nearly 20 years later, unemployment rates had hardly recovered at all ex-
cept in those countries that caught the internet boom of the late 1990s or 
implemented economic reforms. 
Consider next the sort of shock experienced in the U.S. and parts of 
northern Europe in the second half of the '90s: the emerging prospect of new 
industries in the future creating increased needs for capital—as a macroe-
conomic approximation, an anticipated future shift in the productivity pa-
rameter (see Phelps and Glyfi Zoega, 2001). The Mundell-Fleming model 
could only represent such an event as an increase in the marginal efficiency 
of investment, thus a shift of the IS curve, but such a disturbance would 
appreciate the currency by so much as to leave little or no rise in domes-
tic interest rates and consequent release of liquidity, thus little or no rise in 
gross domestic output and employment. Neoclassical theory would depict a 
jump in the demand for leisure (and pro tanto a jump in the real wage), in 
parallel to a jump in consumer demand, and hence a decrease in the work 
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week and possibly a decrease in labor force participation. In fact, from 1996 
to 1999 or 2000, employment zoomed, the labor force clearly rose, and hours 
per employed person inched up, at least in the U.S. and, it appears, in the 
other booming economies too. 
Finally, consider what may have been a major shock of the '60s: the large 
Kennedy tax cut, mostly the reduction in income taxes, enacted in the U.S. 
in 1964.2 The Keynesian models implied that such a tax cut, in causing a 
real exchange rate appreciation, might fail to expand output through a net 
stimulus to aggregate demand but it might still be expansionary by reducing 
the costs of imported intermediary goods. Neoclasical theory suggested an 
expansion through the tax cut's impact on the supply and demand for labor. 
In fact, the U.S. showed no significant real appreciation—there was at first 
a mild depreciation and subsequently a recovery of the exchange rate—and 
the labor force did not appear to rise more than might have resulted from 
the decline of the unemployment rate. The fact that the unemployment did 
decline over the decade suggests that other mechanisms or channels may have 
delivered the famed expansion ; aggregate demand cannot be excluded (since 
there was no appreciation), but the decline of inflation at mid-decade speaks 
somewhat against heavy reliance on that channel. 
We think that this somewhat disappointing performance of the Keynesian 
and neoclassical approaches should impel a closer look by macroeconomists 
into the behavior of the relatively new structuralist models to which we have 
2Personal income taxes were cut by more than 20 percent. The marginal personal 
income tax rates, which ranged from 20 to 91 percent before the cut, ranged from 14 to 
70 percent clS 3i result of the Revenue Act of 1964. 
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referred. And since this third kind of model is dynamic, or intertemporal, 
a careful development of such a model provides the opportunity to compare 
its implications not only over the medium run but for the short run and the 
long run as well. Here we will develop more fully than has been attempted 
so far the small open-economy version of the customer-market model, first 
introduced by Phelps and Sidney Winter (1970) and extended in a general-
equilibrium way in several papers since then (Guillermo Calvo and Phelps, 
1983; Nils Gottfries, 1991; Paul Krugman, 1987; and Phelps, 1994). The 
result is a nonmonetary model of the equilibrium path of the real exchange 
rate, and natural output, employment and interest based on trading frictions 
in the goods market.3 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we develop and study 
the properties of a model suitable for a short-run and medium-run analysis. 
For concreteness, we think of a medium run here as a period during which 
nationals' holdings of net foreign assets are constant. (The justification is 
that wealth will not change by enough, and soon enough, to influence greatly 
the early responses of the jumpy variables and the growth or decline of the 
customer stock.) More precisely, as we will be examining the three shocks 
discussed above under the simplifying assumption that the small open econ-
omy in question is initially neither a net creditor nor net debtor, the level 
of nationals' holdings of net foreign assets held constant in the short- and 
3Charles Engel and John Rogers (2000) show empirically that nominal price stickiness, 
in conjunction with fluctuating nominal exchange rates, alone is not sufficient to explain 
why real exchange rates fluctuate so dramatically. Trading frictions in goods markets are 
also empirically important. 
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medium-run analysis is zero. We will establish conditions under which a 
unique perfect foresight path exists in a 3 x 3 dynamic system with the stock 
of customers as a slow-moving variable. We then move on to apply the model 
to analyze three economic shocks: an expectation of a future step-increase in 
the level of Harrod-neutral productivity parameter; an increase in the exoge-
nously given world real rate of interest; and a permanent balanced-budget 
cut in the wage income tax rate. Section II then turns to the long run, and 
studies the steady-state effects of the three economic shocks under the as-
sumption that the levels of net foreign assets held by nationals adjust fully. 
We also make some observations regarding the current account behavior of 
the small open economy in response to the shocks. Some concluding remarks 
are contained in Section III. 
I. The Mode l in the Short and M e d i u m R u n 
In the product market, firms use domestic labor only to produce for a 
global customer market. Initially, the firms' stock of customers currently 
equals the population of nationals. The size of the domestic labor force, 
which is also the initial stock of customers at domestic firms, is a positive 
constant, both belonging to a population in a demographic stationary state. 
We normalize the size of the domestic labor force to one. The number of 
domestic firms is also taken to be fixed, and the firms are all in identical (or 
symmetrical) circumstances. The characteristic of the customer market in 
the Phelps-Winter model is the informational frictions that would impede a 
quick flow of customers to a firm were it to choose to post a lower price than 
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that being charged elsewhere. A firm setting a price always below that set by 
the other (identically behaving) firms would only gradually drain customers 
from its competitors. Symmetrically, it is supposed that a firm setting a price 
always above that set by the others would see an equally gradual erosion of 
its customer stock, as customers sought alternative suppliers (including for-
eign suppliers) and required varying lengths of time to find them. This is our 
way of modeling 'trading costs,' which Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) argued 
to be essential for explaining a number of puzzles in open economy macroe-
conomics. The Law of One Price, accordingly, can be violated temporarily 
in equilibrium even for traded goods though it holds in steady state (Engel, 
1999). This is because one country's producers may price their goods more 
expensively than those of another at the price of a loss of market share over 
time. 
In the labor market, our firms, while collectively beneficiaries of informa-
tion imperfections in the product market, are victims of imperfect informa-
tion in the workplace. At each firm the members of the firm's work force suffer 
randomly timed and statistically independent episodes of shirking. Workers 
are able to shirk without certainty of being caught because monitoring is ex-
pensive and the firms cannot afford continuous monitoring. But given that 
the firm can monitor costlessly at times when the opportunity presents it-
self, workers know that an act of shirking will be detected with some positive 
probability. Consequently, a worker of given accumulated assets will succumb 
to the urge to shirk with less frequency the greater the opportunity cost of 
being caught and hence dismissed. The effort rate is increasing in the real 
wage offered by the firm where the worker is currently employed, vl, decreas-
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ing in wage-income prospect of persons in the unemployment pool proxied 
by the product of the employment rate (that is, one minus the unemploy-
ment rate) and the expected market wage, (1 — u)ve, and decreasing in the 
worker's average independent income, yw. (Note that if we conceive of the 
wage rate as real wage—measured in domestic consumer goods, say—the cor-
responding average nonwage income yw should be thought of as real nonwage 
income after nonwage transfers and nonwage taxes.4) Making the convenient 
assumption that firms have the identical distribution of employees by age 
and wealth, so that there is nothing special about one firm's employees, and 
assuming that the effort rate is homogeneous of degree zero in the three argu-
ments, we can simply write the effort function as e((l — u)ve/v\yw/vt). We 
assume that e\ < 0, €2 < 0, en < 0, £22 < 0, and ei2 < 0. The assumptions 
that exl < 0 and e22 < 0 ensure that the second-order conditions are satisfied 
while — e12 > 0 means that the marginal effect of raising the real wage on 
effort (given (1 — u)ve) is lower the higher is the nonwage income. 
A firm can combat the shirking propensity of its workers by offering an 
increased wage, raising it above the market-clearing level. As firms generally 
adopt the strategy of paying above-market-clearing wages, the same wage 
at the individual firm confers a reduced advantage—labor input and hence 
output costs more—so unemployment arises. For labor-market equilibrium, 
4When we later consider a reduction in lump-sum transfer payment to match the per-
manent wage income tax cut, we will see that as the decrease in lump-sum transfer payment 
reduces the after-transfer nonwage income, the efficiency wage needed to minimize unit 
cost is also reduced. The transfer payment adds to nonwage income on the assumption 
that the worker receives it from the government whether or not he is or will be employed. 
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ve at any given 1 — u is just large enough that, for all i, v% = ve: none 
of the identical firms sees an advantage in offering a still-higher wage to 
further reduce shirking. This apparatus delivers the well-known wage curve 
portraying the equilibrium wage as rising with 1 — u. We would remark that 
other models of the wage curve exist, for example Christopher Pissarides 
(2000), which suitably formulated, would permit the same results that we 
obtain. We now develop the supply side of the model in the form of the 
labor-market equilibrium before turning to study the product and capital 
markets. 
A. The Labor Market 
Let the ith firm's output z1 be given by Aen*, where A is the index of 
Harrod-neutral productivity level and n% is the number of the firm's employ-
ees. For costs to be at a minimum at any given employment level, the wage at 
the i th firm must be high enough to minimize the ratio of its wage, vl, to effort 
at the firm, e((l — u)ve/vl,yw/V). The minimization problem at such a firm 
may be described as c l = min [f l/(Ae((l — u)ve/v\yw/vt))] by choosing v\ 
With the labor force a constant, the number of persons supplied to the labor 
market per firm is a constant, ns. If n is the average employment at the 
other firms, then u is approximately (ns — n)/ns. The optimal choice of v% 
yields the generalized Solow elasticity condition: 
:D ( i - n ) ( - ) ( £ l ) + (^ ) (^ ) 1. 
Labor-market equilibrium and the similiarity of firms imply that v% 
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(2) 
ve. Under these conditions, (1) simplifies to 
^ - ^(7) + (y-)Cj) 1. 
Noting that the first and second arguments in the effort function are now 
given by 1 — u and yw/v, respectively, we infer from (2) that v/yw is an 
increasing function of 1 — it: 




d(l - u) 2e2 + (1 - u)el2 + ( ^ ) e 2 2 > 0 . 
^ = $(l-u); &(l-u)>0. 
In the absence of any taxes and transfers, and recalling that we are holding 
the level of net foreign assets constant at zero for a short- to medium-term 
analysis, a suitable normalization of the fixed number of firms at one implies 
that yw + (1 — u)v = Ae[l — u]. Then, using (3), we obtain 
Ae[l ~ u] 
y
 ~ 1 + (1 - u)$(i -
 uy 
whence c = v/(Ae) = (v/yw)(yw/(Ae)) = [(1 - u ) $ ( l - u)][l + (1 - u ) $ ( l -
M ) ] _ 1 . Hence, the unit cost c is a monotone increasing function of the economy-
wide employment rate, 1 — u. Now if we limit ourselves to situations where 
increased output would require increased employment (and so excluding the 
case where the effect of reduced unemployment on effort might swamp the 
effect of having more persons at work), we make z a montone increasing 
function of 1 — u.5 Noting that z = Ae[l — u] = csx, where cs is the ouput 
5The mathematical condition is that (1 — u)e\ — (1 — w)e2<i? <&' + e A 0. 
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supplied per customer and x is the total stock of customers, we can write c 
= Y(cs:r/A); T'(csx/A) > 0.6 Hence the firm's unit cost, c, is increasing in 
aggregate output (relative to the measure of productivity), and there may 
be said to be rising "industry cost" despite constant cost at the individual 
firm through the wage and shirking effects of increased employment. 
B. The Product Market 
Our objective here is to develop a model of the small open economy 
in which all firms, foreign and domestic, operate in a market subject to 
informational frictions. In the case we are examining here, initially all the 
relevant customers of national firms—firms that produce only with national 
labor—are nationals. Although the small open economy is too small to affect 
perceptibly the world real rate of interest, by definition, disturbances to the 
demand of its national customers will certainly be felt by national firms, 
and so will the exchange rate and the real interest rate in terms of the good 
supplied by national firms and their price. 
With regard to the ith firm, we let x\ a continuous variable, denote (the 
size of) its customer stock; let csi denote the amount of consumer output it 
supplies per customer; and let R% denote its price, say, in units of the domestic 
good.7 We will let R denote the price at the other domestic firms and Re 
6The intermediate step to prove this is to use the relationship e(l — u, $ _ 1)[1 — u] = 
c
s
x/A. Since 1 — u is increasing in csx/A under our assumption, and c is increasing in 
1 — u, hence c is increasing in csx/A. 
7Expressing all prices in terms of the foreign good would not substantively alter the 
analysis. 
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the price that the firm and its customers expect is being charged by other 
domestic firms (all measured in units of the domestic good). We introduce 
a variable p, where p _ 1 tells us how many units of the domestic good must 
be given up in exchange for one unit of the foreign good. Consequently, an 
increase in p is a real exchange rate appreciation. 
In product-market equilibrium, by definition, every firm and its customers 
have correct expectations about the other firms, that is, p = pe. With their 
expectations thus identical in product-market equilibrium, the identically 
situated domestic firms will then behave alike, so that p% = p = pe. 
A firm, in maximizing the value of its shares, has to strike a balance be-
tween the benefits of a high price, which are increased revenue and reduced 
cost, thus increased profit, in the present, and the benefits of a low price, 
which are an increased profit base in the future as customers elsewhere grad-
ually learn of the firm's price advantage. The key dynamic is therefore the 
law of motion of the firm's customer stock, 
(4) -£ = gi^PtKl 9i < 0; gn < 0; g2 < 0; g(l,1) = 0. 
The joint assumption that g\ < 0 and gn < 0 means that the marginal 
returns to price concessions are nonincreasing, in the sense that successive 
price reductions of an equal amount by firm i yield a nonincreasing sequence 
of increments to the exponential growth rate of customers. The inequality 
g2 < 0 implies a drain of customers to foreign suppliers when the real ex-
change rate appreciates. What the sign of g12 is relates to the question of 
what the effect of foreign competition on domestic firms' market power is. 
Suppose that p < 1 so there has been a real exchange rate depreciation, 
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hence foreign goods are selling at a premium. Then each identically situated 
domestic firm is increasing its market share at the expense of foreign suppli-
ers. In such an environment, a reduction in p^, given p, can be expected to 
generate a smaller increase in the rate of inflow of customers compared to a 
situation where p > 1 (and each identically situated domestic firm is losing 
customers to foreign suppliers). Since stiffer foreign competition (higher pi) 
confers a higher marginal return to a price concession, firm i is induced to go 
further in reducing its markup, holding other things constant. In our theory, 
therefore, the assumption that g\2 < 0 implies that an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate will lead to lower domestic markups and hence increased 
output supplied due to the increased competition that domestic producers 
face from foreign suppliers. We will proceed with our analysis under the 
assumption that g12 < 0 but make some observations along the way about 
the case where g12 = 0. 
The firm has to choose the price at which to sell to its current customers. 
Raising its price causes a decrease, and lowering the price an increase, in 
the quantity demanded by its current customers according to a per-customer 
demand relationship, D(pl/p, c r), where cr in this context is set equal to the 
average expenditure per customer, cd, at the other firms. For simplicity, we 
assume that D(-) is homogeneous of degree one in total sales, cr, and so we 
write cr% = r\{jf j'p)cr; r]'(pl/p) < 0; r/(l) = 1. Each firm chooses the path 
of its real price or, equivalently, the path of its supply per customer to its 
consumers, to maximize the present discounted value of its cash flows. The 
maximum at the ith firm is the value of the firm, V\ which depends upon 
13 
VQ = max ft*"! _ TV * r ] ( ^ ) c ^ e x p - / o ^ s t / t . 
TV A 
The maximization is subject to the differential equation giving the motion of 
the stock of customers of the i th firm as a function of its relative, or real, price 
and the real exchange rate given by (4) and an initial xl0. The current-value 





V(-)csxl + qlng(-,p)xt 
where q%m is the shadow price, or worth, of an additional customer. The 
first-order condition for optimal p% is 
(5) V{ p c x 
p p 
iP~) - T(^) V ( L ) — + ? ^ I ( - , P ) - = O. 
p p p p 
Another two other necessary first-order conditions (which are also sufficient 
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Xt 0. 
We now show that "marginal q" denoted q7m is equal to "average q," which 




r \XiJu + 
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which we can integrate and then use (7) to obtain 
t U -^ i- P 
Hence, qim = q\ = q\ 
Equating p% to p, and setting q% = q, delivers the condition on consumer-
good supply per firm for product-market equilibrium: 
1 , Mi!_7Y—1 
7/(1) { A ) ^
S l ( 1
' ^ ; , ( l ) = l . 
V ?/(l) 
The expression in the square brackets is the algebraic excess of marginal 
revenue over marginal cost, a negative value in customer-market models as 
the firm supplies more than called for by the static monopolist's formula for 
maximum current profit, giving up some of the maximum current profit for 
the sake of its longer-term interests. An increase in q means that profits from 
future customers are high so that each firm reduces its price ( equivalently 
its markup) in order to increase its customer base. Hence lower prices in 
the Phelps-Winter model are a form of investment, an investment in market 
share. Note also the role played by the real exchange rate (p). If stiffer 
foreign competition leads to reduced market power of domestic firms, then 
a higher p leads domestic firms to increase their output even further beyond 
the point where current marginal revenue equals marginal cost as dictated 
by a static monopolist. This channel is absent if g12 = 0. 
From (8), we can express consumer-good supply per customer relative to 
productivity, c s/A, in terms of q/A, p, and x, that is, cs/A = Q(q/A,p,x). 
It is straightforward to show that 0 < eq/^ = c/ln(cs/A)/c/ln(g/A) < 1, ep = 
c/ln(c s/A)/c/lnp > 0 and — 1 < ex = c/ln(cs/A)/c/lna; < 0, where ej denotes 
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the partial elasticity of cs/A with respect to the variable j . As explained 
before, an increase in q makes investments in customers through reducing 
the markup attractive and so expands output. An increase in p, that is, a 
real exchange rate appreciation causes markups to decrease as domestic firms 
face stiffer competition from foreign suppliers and hence increases output and 
employment. Finally, with rising marginal costs, an increase in the number 
of customers at each firm leads to a less than proportionate decline in the 
amount of output supplied per customer. 
C. The Capital Market 
Finally we sketch the mechanisms of saving, investment and asset valua-
tion in the capital market. Households have to plan how much of income to 
save, putting their savings in domestic shares; any excess is invested overseas 
and any deficiency implies the placement of shares overseas. Firms have to 
plan their accumulation of customers, issuing (retiring) a share for each cus-
tomer gained (lost); any excess of customers over the domestic population 
implies some customers are overseas and any deficiency means that foreign 
firms have a share of the market. Since the stock of customers, hence shares, 
is sluggish, the level of the share price must clear the asset market. 
In a symmetric situation across firms, (6) simplifies to 
(9) ^ + - + g(l,p)=r, 
q q 
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. This equation in the 
firm's instantaneous rate of return to investment in its stock of assets, which 
are customers, is an intertemporal condition of capital-market equilibrium: 
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it is entailed by correct expectations of q, r and p at all future dates. We 
will make the assumption that initially the shares issued by domestic firms 
are all held by nationals. 
Drawing upon the Blanchard-Yaari model of finite-lived dynasties subject 
to exponential mortality, it is argued that the economy here satisfies an Euler-
type differential equation in the rate of change of consumption per customer, 
c
d
. Consumption growth is governed by the excess of the interest rate over 
the rate of pure time preference, denoted p, and by the ratio of (nonhuman) 
wealth, denoted W, to consumption. Upon setting customers' consumption 
per customer equal to the output supplied to them per customer, cr, we 
obtain 
(10) £ = {rt-p)<r-0{p + p)Wu 
where 9 denotes the instantaneous probability of death and W = qx here. In 
requiring here that q at each moment be at such a level as to make the path 
of planned consumption (its growth as well as its level) consistent with the 
path of output from (8), we are requiring that the market where goods are 
exchanged for shares (at price q) be in equilibrium. No household will find 
the prevailing share price different from what is expected.8 
Finally, for international capital-market equilibrium with perfect capital 
mobility, we must satisfy the real interest parity condition, which states that 
any excess of domestic real interest rate, r, over the exogenously given world 
real rate of interest, r*, must be met by an exact amount of expected rate of 
8Prom (10), we obtain an expression giving us the consumer's required rate of interest: 
r — p + 9(9 + p)(qx/cs) + (cs/cs). By noting that cs/A = fl(q/A,p,x), we can further 
replace (cs/cs) by eq/A(q/q) + ep(p/p) + exg(l,p). 
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real exchange depreciation. This equation is: 
f i l l r = r* - -
P 
Equations (8) to (11) give us four equations in the four variables: c s/A, 
q/A, p, and x. However, using the relation cs/A = Q(q/A,p,x) derived 
from (8), we can reduce the system to three dynamic equations in the three 
variables: q/A, p, and x, the last being a slow-moving variable. We proceed 
to do the necessary substitutions to obtain and analyze the 3 x 3 dynamic 
system, showing the conditions under which a unique perfect foresight path 
exists. 
D. The 3 x 3 Dynamic System 
The dynamics of the system can be described by the behavior of the 
endogenous variables q/A, p, and x after substituting out for cs/A using 
c
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(1 - eq/A) + ep 
1 - e q/A 
X 
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h(^,P,x) 
f(j,P,x) 
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h{A^x) = " -p-An(q/A,p,x)+e*9M-
The linearized dynamic system around the steady-state ((q/A)ss,pss, xs 
where pss = 1 and xss = 1 is given by: 
(15) if S ^ H i L '-1 - * 
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(1 - eq/A) + e^ 
e9/A 
/g/A 
(1 - e.q/k) + e^ 
eg/A 
(1 - eg/A) + ep 
fp 
Jx 
« 2 2 = 
«23 = 
a3i = 0 
a32 = 9p 
a33 = 0. 
We have ^ < 0 as a real exchange rate appreciation leads to a flow decrease 
of customers (so x < 0 when p > 1), and we can readily check that /g/A > 0, 
hq/A < 0, j x > 0, and /ix < 0. In conjunction with the following two assump-
tions, we obtain signs for fp and hp, which provide sufficient conditions for a 
unique perfect foresight path: 
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Assumption 1: Ceteris paribus, an increase in p raises the rate of return 
to holding a share in the domestic firm by raising the quasi-rent, [1 — 
T(csx/A)]cs, taken as a ratio to q, by more that it decreases the rate at 
which the customer base shrinks, gp. 
Assumption 2: Ceteris paribus, an increase in p reduces the customer's re-
quired rate of interest through shrinking the (nonhuman) wealth to consump-
tion ratio, 6(6 + p)(qx/cs), by more than it increases the required interest 
rate through raising the growth rate of consumption, —exgp. 
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we also have fp < 0 and hp > 0. We can 
then sign the elements in the matrix A as follows: 
Lemma 1: a n > 0, ai2 < 0, a^ > 0, a2\ < 0, a22 > 0, a23 < 0, and a32 < 0.9 
To examine stability of the above 3 x 3 dynamical system, we evaluate its 
Jacobian matrix A at the steady-state equilibrium, ((q/A.)ss,pss,xss), where 
pss = 1 and xss = 1. The eigenvalues of A are the solutions of its character-
istic equation 
(16) - 7 3 + Tr(A) 7 2 - R(A)j + Det(A) = 0, 
9To obtain the signs of an, ci\2, and a^, we use the property that / = r* — g — [1 — 
T](cs/q) — h and apply Assumptions 1 and 2 to obtain: an — —[(1 + ej3)/((l — eq/^) + 
ep)][d{[l - T](cs/q)}/d(q/A) + [1 - (ep/(l + ep))]hq/A] > 0, a12 = - [ (1 + ep)/((l - eq/A) + 
ep)][d{[l - T](cs/q)}/dp + gp + [l- (ep/(l + ep))]hp] < 0, and a13 = - [ (1 + ep)/((l -
eg/A) + ep)][d{[l - T](cs/q)}/dx + [1 - (ep/(l + ep))]hx] > 0. 
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where the trace of A is Tr(A) = a n + <222, the determinant is Det(A) = 
«32(«2i«i3 - «n«23), and R(A) = ana22 - «i2«2i - «23«32- Using Lemma 1, 
we see readily that Tr(A) > 0. We now show that Det(A) < 0. Since a32 < 0, 
we need to show that a2i«i3 — «ii«23 > 0 or [(—0,23)/(—0-21)] > [«i3/«ii]- We 
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Since [(1 - eg / A)/eg / A] > 0 > - [ e ^ / ( l + e#)], and - a 2 3 > 0, -a21 > 0, a13 > 0 
and a n > 0 by Lemma 1, we have [(—«23)/(—a2i)] > [ a i3/ an]- 1 0 
The product of the roots of the system is given by the determinant. Since 
it is negative, this establishes that there are either three negative roots or 
one. A necessary condition for stability of a 3 x 3 system is that the trace 
of the matrix A be negative. Since Tr(A) has been shown to be positive, 
accordingly, the dynamic system represented by (15) is unstable, implying 
it has at least one positive root. Since we know it has either zero or two 
10Let d = fx > 0, b = —hx > 0, c = fq/A > 0, and d = — hq/^ > 0. Also, let 
F = [(1 — eqjh)leqjK\ > 0 and G = [ep/(l + ep)] > 0. It follows that since a — Gb > 0 and 
c-Gd > 0, [a + Fb]/[c + Fd] > [a-Gb]/[c-Gd] if and only if F > -G ( a condition that 
is satisfied since G > 0) and be > ad. The latter condition can be reduced to ^^ < fi — 1, 
where fi is the ratio of price to marginal cost (or markup). In equilibrium, /x_1 = c. Hall 
(1988) uses value added as a measure of output and estimates the value of/i to range from 
over 1.8 to a little under 4 for the seven one-digit industries he studies, with an average 
value of 2.8. Using the average value of /z as a benchmark, we will require that a one 
percent increase in x leads to a less than 1.8 percent rise in unit cost. 
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positive roots, it must have two. There is, therefore, a unique negative root, 
denoted 71, and a unique perfect foresight path that converges to the steady 
state exists.11 
Of the dynamic variables, the customer stock is constrained to move 
continuously at all times, while the price of the share and the real exchange 
rate may both jump instantaneously in response to new information. The 
solution of the linearized system for the behavior of the stock of customers 
is: 
(17) xt = 1 - (1 - xQ) exp71*, 
whence 
(18) xt = -ll(l-xt). 
Corresponding to any given level of the customer base are an equilibrium 
level of the real exchange rate and a share price. In particular, 
(19) pt = l+(^\{xt-l). 
Note that (19) describes a linear relationship between p and x that is posi-
tively sloped. The relationship linking share price to the stock of customers 
n W e could also have shown that there is one negative eigenvalue and two eigenvalues 
with positive real part by an application of the Routh theorem, which requires that the 
number of roots of the polynomial in (16) with positive real parts be equal to the number 
of variations of sign in the scheme-1 Tv(A) - R(A) + [Det(A)/Tr(A)] Det(A). 
With only the sign of R(A) ambiguous but Tr(A) A 0 and Det(A) < 0, there are exactly 
two changes in sign. Accordingly, there are one negative eigenvalue and two eigenvalues 
with positive real parts. 
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is given by12 
(xt ~ 1), 
where the terms a -^ can be identified as being the appropriate elements of 
the matrix appearing in (15). 
We note from (20) or the alternative expression appearing in footnote (12) 
that the linear relationship between share price q and customer stock x can be 
positively or negatively sloped. The economic intuition is that there are two 
opposing forces working to affect q as we slide upwards along the (p, x) saddle 
path. Suppose that , beginning at an initial steady state with xss = 1 and 
pss = 1, there is a helicopter drop of customers, so x is increased above one. 
As domestic interest rate is increased as a result (on account of an increased 
nonhuman wealth to consumption ratio, and an expected flow decrease of 
customers, which raises the growth rate of consumption per customer by 
the amount —ex[x/x] = —exg(l,p) > 0), and an incipient capital inflow 
brings about a real exchange rate appreciation, firms are induced to reduce 
their markups and so increase output as competition with foreign suppliers 
intensifies. This acts to raise the quasi-rent earned on each customer, thus 
causing an increase in the share price q. This effect acts to give a positive 
slope to the (g/A, x) schedule. An increase in x, however, partially crowds 
out the consumer supply per customer because of rising marginal costs. This 
effect tends to reduce the quasi-rent earned on each customer, and tends to 
impart a negative slope to the (g/A, x) schedule. The effect of a larger stock 
12We could alternatively express this relationship as: (<?t/A) = (q/K)ss + [(71(71 — 
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7i - a n 
of customers on the value of the stock market is therefore ambiguous and 
two cases have to be considered. 
Nevertheless, we can ask whether empirical evidence can help us deter-
mine the more relevant case. As we shall see when we examine the shock 
taking the form of an increase in the external real interest rate, the stock 
market response on impact shows a decrease in share prices in the case of a 
positive (g/A, x) schedule but an increase in share prices in the other case. 
Since empirically, we tend to observe a decline in stock market value in, say, 
Asian stock markets when the US interest rate rises, it might be that the 
case of a positive (q/A,x) schedule is empirically more relevant.13 The rea-
son that the stock market may theoretically rise in the small open economy 
when there is an increase in the external real interest rate is that the re-
sulting real depreciation leads to an increased flow of customers gained from 
foreign suppliers. Due to rising marginal costs, an increase in the growth 
rate of customers gained implies a decline in the growth rate of consumption 
13It should be remarked that for this cdsh to suhvdil, it is nhchssduy thdt g\2 < 3, so 
thdt stiffhu i ouhign comshtition lhdds to uhduchd mdukht sowhu i ou domhstic fiums1 Thh 
uhddhu cdn chhck thdt whhn g^ = 3, wh hdvh fp > 3, hp < 3 dnd so a\i > 3 dnd CJ22 < 3. 
Li nhvhuthhlhss, Tu+A, = an + a^i > 3, wh obtdin d uniquh shuih ct iouhsight sdth, dnd 
thh + q/A, x, schhdulh is undmbiguously nhgdtivh +shh +53,,1 Thh intuition iou thh nhgdtivh 
slosh is thh i ollowing1 Sussosh thdt stduting iuom thh sthddy stdth, thhuh is d hhlicosthu 
duos oi customhus so x incuhdshs dbovh onh1 Although thh highhu domhstic inthuhst udth 
buings dbout uhdl dssuhcidtion, thh highhu p hds no diuhct hffhct on thh consumhu sussly shu 
customhu undhu thh d ssumstion thdt 512 = 31 Lnsthdd thh highhu x cuowds out consumhu 
sussly shu customhu, which uhduchs qudsi-uhnt1 Thh highhu discount udth d s s lihd to d 
uhduchd flow oi qudsi-uhnts undmbiguously uhduchs q1 
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per customer, which acts to lower the domestic rate of interest. The lower 
discount rate applied to future cash flows tends to raise stock market value. 
E. Analysis of Shocks 
We now apply our apparatus to study the short- and medium-run effects 
of three shocks: (i) an anticipation of a step-increase in the Harrod-neutral 
index of productivity to occur in the future; (ii) an increase in the external 
real rate of interest; and (iii) a permanent cut in the wage income tax. 
Anticipation of a future step-increase in productivity level.—Consider a 
small open economy initially in steady state, which is neither a net creditor 
nor a net debtor, so the real exchange rate, p, equals one, and the stock 
of customers buying from domestic firms include all and only nationals. At 
time to, there is news that at some time tx in the future, the index of Harrod-
neutral productivity parameter will experience a permanent increase from A0 
to Ai. 
To understand the economy's response to such a shock, it is useful to first 
consider the case of an unanticipated permanent increase in A. As we can 
observe from the system of equations given in (12) to (14), or its linearized 
version given in (15), expressed in terms of the following three variables: 
q/A, p, and x, such a shock is neutral for the real exchange rate, the real 
interest rate (which equals the exogenously given world real interest rate, r*), 
and the stock of customers. If the increase of productivity were 10 percent, 
say, share price denoted q will rise immediately by 10 percent (leaving q/A 
unchanged) as also will consumer expenditure and supply per customer. The 
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trade balance, initially equal to zero, remains unchanged. 
When the same shock is expected to occur only some time in the future, 
however, the share price will rise initially by less than 10 percent. With in-
creased financial wealth, domestic consumption demand, and hence aggregate 
demand, increases. Such increased aggregate demand imposes an increased 
domestic real interest rate, which brings about an incipient capital inflow 
that causes the real exchange rate to appreciate. To preserve real interest 
parity, the extent of current exchange rate appreciation must be high enough 
to cause an expected rate of real depreciation (—p/p > 0) that is equal to the 
interest premium, r — r*. The stronger domestic currency increases the extent 
of foreign competition, resulting in domestic firms shrinking markups and so 
increasing supplies and expanding employment. As business asset valuation 
has also increased (q/A is up), the profits accruing to future customers are 
higher so that each firm is induced to reduce markup on this score.14 In the 
short run, therefore, the small open economy experiences a structural boom. 
To study the medium-term adjustment, it is useful to develop a diagram 
(see Figure 1 for the case of a positively-sloped (q/A, x) schedule and Figure 
2 for the case of a negatively-sloped (q/A, x) schedule). We will focus our 
discussion here by making reference only to Figure 1. It is clear that the 
final rest point coinciding with the medium run analysis (point X in Figure 
1) is also the original point we started the analysis with. Upon receiving 
the news of a future productivity increase, p jumps up from point X to 
point Y in the upper panel of Figure 1, and q/A similiarly jumps up in the 
14This result is obtained whether the (q/A, x) schedule is positively or negatively sloped. 
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lower panel of Figure 1. At time t\ when the productivity increase actually 
takes place, the economy must be back on the respective saddle paths, point 
Z in the lower and upper panels of Figure 1. In the interim before the 
actual productivity increase takes place, that is, in the pre-surge period, 
the real exchange rate (which had initially appreciated upon receiving the 
news) gradually weakens so that the algebraic flow loss of customers (recall 
x = g(l,p)x; g,p < 0) also gradually falls. At a time before ti (when the 
productivity increase actually takes place), the real exchange rate in fact falls 
below one and the economy begins to regain customers ahead of the actual 
productivity increase. Meanwhile, the stock market enjoys a bull run. What 
happens to employment in the interim before t{? We see that employment, 
which had jumped up initially, continues to be pulled up by a rising share 
price (relative to the productivity parameter) but gradually pulled down by 
a gradual end to the real appreciation, and by the loss of customers. 
What is unambiguous is what happens to employment at t\ when the 
productivity increase actually materializes? Employment at that point must 
experience an abrupt decline (so the unemployment rate suddenly jumps up) 
as an unchanged output is now produced by a smaller number of workers. In 
fact, at point Z in the upper and lower panels of Figure 1, which corresponds 
to the arrival of the productivity surge, employment must be below the initial 
level. Consequently, a structural slump takes place in the post-surge period 
although recovery gradually takes place as market share is regained that 
was lost to foreign suppliers in the pre-surge period. At the medium-run 
rest point, employment is back to where it was originally so the recovery is 
complete. We leave it to the reader to trace the implied path of employment 
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corresponding to the dynamics shown in Figure 2. 
An inchi@si in thi i xtihn@* hi@* intihist h@ti.—To analyze what happens 
to the small open economy in response to the rise of the external real interest 
rate, it is useful to state the conditions satisfied in the medium-run steady 
state. The relevant equations are: 
(21) 
(22) 
1 | Vi1) y(cSx) 
7/(1) {A> 
• [1 - T(^)]C 
cJ\ ?/•'(!) r 
(23) r* = p + 6(6 + p)(^j 
where use has been made of the fact that in the steady state, r = r* and 
p = 1. Equation (21) gives us our consumer supply equation, (22) states 
the equality between the rate of return to holding a share and the world real 
interest rate, and (23) states the equality between the world real interest rate 
and the consumer's required rate of interest. This is a system of equations 
in the three variables, q/cs, cs/A and x. 
From (21), we note that csx/A is a monotone increasing function of q/cs 
as an increase in the latter induces firms to reduce their markups and hence 
increase output. Substituting out for csx/A in (22) using this function, we 
see that q/cs is uniquely pinned down by the external rate of interest, r*. In 
particular, an increase in r* reduces q/cs and causes firms to increase their 
markups. Using this result in (23), we can infer that in the medium-run 
steady state, an increase in r* reduces q/cs and necessitates a rise in x to 
equate the consumer's required rate of interest to the now higher external 
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interest rate. 
The sudden increase in the external real rate of interest above domes-
tic interest rate causes an outflow of capital, which leads to an immediate 
real depreciation. As domestic firms are shielded from foreign competition, 
they are induced to raise their markups and shrink supplies. Consequently, 
employment falls on this account. If we take the empirically relevant case 
of a decline in business asset valuation in response to a higher external real 
interest rate, there is a further cutback on firms' supplies as firms' reduced 
valuation of an additional customer induces them to raise their markups, 
raising profits in the near term. This case is depicted in Figure 3.15 
How does employment adjust in the medium term? As market share is 
gradually increased, employment slowly recovers. Furthermore, the recovery 
is aided by a gradual appreciation as the real exchange rate slowly increases 
back to the value of one, and the share price, q slowly recovers in the empir-
ically relevant case. But will the recovery be complete in the sense that at 
the medium-run rest point, employment is back to the pre-shock level? The 
answer is no, so the rise in external real interest rate permanently raises the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment. To see this, recall that we have shown 
15If the (q/A, x) schedule is negatively sloped (not shown), it is implied that q initially 
jumps up. This is because the real depreciation (decline in p from a value of one) causes 
x, which was originally zero, to turn positive as overseas customers are gained. Since an 
increase in x causes the amount of consumer supply per customer to decline due to rising 
marginal costs, the domestic interest rate is reduced by the amount ex[x/x] = exg(l,p) A 
0 as p falls below one. The lower discount rate applied to future profits increases the 
valuation of a customer and acts to offset the tendency for q to decrease on account of 
reduced quasi-rents per customer, [1 — T]cs, brought about by a real depreciation. 
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above that in the medium-run steady state, q/cs, is reduced as a result of a 
higher r*. This implies that csx/A = e(l —u) is decreased as firms raise their 
markups permanently. A plot of the employment rate time path shows that 
it is permanently shifted down. We also take note that q (equivalently q/A 
as A here is held fixed) also does not fully recover back to its original level. 
To see this, we write 
*-G)®(x)-
Noting that the last bracketed term, csx/A is monotone increasing in q/cs, 
it is clear that a rise in r* leads to a fall in q/A in the medium-run steady 
state since x is increased and q/cs is decreased. 
A permanent reduction in wage income tax rate.—To study the effects of 
a permanent cut in the wage income tax rate, let us now suppose that initially 
a wage income tax is applied to finance a lump-sum transfer that the worker 
receives from the government whether or not he is or will be employed. Let 
the amount of the lump-sum transfer per member of the labor force be equal 
to ys. The real wage in terms of domestic output received by the worker, vh, is 
related to the labor cost to the firm of a worker, vf, by v? = (1 -\-r)vh, r being 
the proportional payroll tax rate. Our nonwage income, yw, now includes a 
positive level of the government transfer.16 Solving the cost minimization 
problem of the firm now leads to the supply-wage locus: 
(24) ^ = $ ( 1 - U ) ; &(l-u)>0. 
16In the basic model studied above, we had assumed for the sake of simplicity zero taxes 
and transfers. 
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With yw now including a positive level of government transfer, we now 
have the accounting relationship yw — ys + (1 — u)v? = Ae[l — u]. Using (24) 
in this accounting relationship, we derive 
Ae[l - u] + ys 
l + ( l - u ) ( l + r ) $ ( l u 
whence the unit cost, c, can be written as 
(25) unit cost = — = $(1 - it) (1 u (1 + r ) " 1 + (1 - u ) $ ( l - u) 
With balanced budget, the level of government transfer per member of the 
labor force is related to the payroll tax rate, r , by 
(26) {l-u) = j^vt{l-u)=ys. TVh(l -u) 
Using the government budget constraint given in (26), we can obtain, after 
some tedious steps, an expression for ys/(Ae) appearing in (25): 
(27) Te=T{1~u) 
'l-u)^(l-u) 
l + ( l - u ) $ ( l -u) 
Using (27) to substitute out for ys/(Ae) in (25), we see that at given 
employment rate, 1 — it, a balanced-budget reduction in the payroll tax rate, 
r , reduces the unit cost, c. On the proviso made earlier that increased output 
would require increased employment, we establish that c= T(csx/A, r ) ; T i > 
0; T 2 > 0. 
The set of conditions representing the medium-run steady state with a 
positive payroll tax, which finances a government transfer in a balanced bud-
get manner, is represented by 
(2* 1 Mil 
7/(1) 
T ( X , r ) ^ y i (M) 7/(1) ; *7(i) = i 
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(30)
 r* = p + e(6 + p)^y 
Suppose that the small open economy, initially in a steady state with payroll 
tax rate equal to To, imposes a permanent tax cut with the payroll tax rate 
reduced to Ti, T\ < To, and lump-sum transfers are correspondingly reduced 
to balance the budget. We see from (28) and (29) that such a permanent 
tax cut leaves q/cs unchanged from its initial level and hence the equilibrium 
markup unaffected. The reason is that as a result of the tax cut, the unit cost 
is reduced at any given level of a firm's output (equivalently, at a given rate 
of employment) as workers are encouraged to put in more work effort or to 
shirk less on account of a higher take-home pay relative to nonwage income. 
(In effect, the tax cut shifts down the wage curve in the (vf, 1 — u) plane.) 
The increased work incentive, at any employment rate, means that firms' 
profits are up, which leads to increased hiring. Normal profits are restored 
only when the increased employment and consequent increase in each firm's 
output pulls up unit cost back to its original level. 
From (30), we see that with q/cs unchanged, the stock of customers, x, is 
also unchanged. Since we know that employment jumps up, consumer supply 
per customer, cs must have increased. We want to prove that consumer 
demand per customer cd, which was equal to consumer supply per customer 
c
s
 initially, must jump up by exactly the same amount. Note that in the 
Blanchard-Yaari set-up, consumer demand per customer is given by cd = [9 + 
p)[H + W], where H is human wealth and W = qx is financial wealth. Now, 
human wealth can, at the initial steady state, be expressed as if = [(vh(l — 
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u)/{r* + 9))Jr{ys/(r* + 6))]. Using the government budget constraint, rvh{l — 
u) = ys, and the relation vf = (1 + r)vh, allows us to write human wealth as 
H = vf(l — u)/(r* + 9). Dividing and multiplying by Ae allows us to express 
H in terms of unit cost, c= T(csx/A, r ) , that is, H = T(csx/A, r)csx/{r*+0). 
Consequently, we can express consumer demand per customer as 
(31) cd = (6 + p) 
r* + 6 
Recall that the tax cut leaves the unit cost unchanged, and q increases by the 
same proportion as cs increases, since q/cs is unchanged. With x unchanged, 
if cd equals cs initially, it must rise by the same proportion as cs rises. The end 
result is that employment is expanded without a need for any real exchange 
rate adjustment since human wealth and financial wealth rise by the same 
proportion to cause consumer demand per customer to rise and match the 
higher consumer supply brought about by increased employment. As Figure 
4 shows, q/A jumps up with no change in x and p. 
II. T h e Long R u n 
For a medium-run analysis, we held nationals' holdings of net foreign 
assets constant. Now, we introduce explicitly into our analysis another vari-
able, the private holdings of net foreign assets, denoted F, which we allow 
to adjust to economic conditions. Like the stock of customers, x, the hold-
ing of net foreign assets, F, is a slow-moving variable. Around the steady 
state, where the economy is initially neither a net creditor nor a net debtor 
so F = 0, an additional equation to be introduced (in terms of the unit cost 
33 
c= T(csa;/A) and supposing zero taxes and government transfers) is 
(32) « W = rW + T(^)csx -cd; W = F + qx. 
We focus on the steady state and we are interested to ask how the em-
ployment rate, 1 — u, and the level of net foreign assets, F, behave in the 
long run. Once we allow explicitly for the level of net foreign assets to adjust, 
it turns out convenient to use the Blanchard-Yaari equation, which can be 
expressed as r* = p + 6(6 + p)W/cd. Using the consumption function used 
earlier, and the definition of human wealth, we obtain 
6 (33) r = p • yw = (r* + 6)(F + qx). l + ^ ( l - u ) 
Note that nonwage income, yw, includes interest earnings (payments) on 
net foreign assets. Using (33), we obtain a relationship that is a hyperbola 
in Figure 5. Along such a schedule, the level of net foreign assets adjusts 
to achieve capital market equilibrium. The other positively-sloped schedule 
describes labor-market equilibrium and is given by (3). Their intersection 
determines the long-run employment rate, 1-u. Algebraically, to determine 
long run employment we can substitute out for v/yw in (33) using (3) to 
obtain: 
<34» r , = ' + i
 + »( i - . , ) ( i -o-









Equation (34) tells us straightforwardly that if the economy starts off ini-
tially at the long-run steady-state position, the productivity shock leaves the 
employment rate unaffected in the long run even after holdings of net foreign 
assets have fully adjusted. The long-run natural rate of unemployment is 
neutral to the anticipated surge of productivity even though unemployment 
adjusts in the short and medium run. From (21) and (22), which continue 
to apply in the long run, q/cs is unchanged. Using this result in (35) shows 
that with F = 0 initially, the small open economy returns to that position in 
the long run. Thus the economy runs a deficit on its trade balance initially 
as consumption jumps up in anticipation of the future surge in productivity. 
At some stage, however, the trade balance moves into surplus in such a way 
that its present value equals the present discounted value of the trade deficits 
incurred. 
Equation (34) also tells us that a higher external rate of real interest leaves 
the natural rate of unemployment higher in the long run after holdings of 
net foreign assets have fully adjusted. (In terms of Figure 5, an increase 
in r* shifts the downward-sloping schedule towards the origin.) Hence the 
employment rate never fully recovers even in the long run. As to the level of 
net foreign assets holding in the long run, an examination of (35) tells us that 
it is ambiguous. The increase of r* reduces both qx and e[l — u] = csx/A. 
What about the long-run effects of the permanent wage income tax cut 
after holdings of net foreign assets have fully adjusted? From (28) and (29), 
which continue to apply to the long run, q/cs is unchanged, so the equilibrium 
markup is unchanged. This implies that each firm's output and employment 
expand. To see that the holding of net foreign assets, which was zero to begin 
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with remains at zero, we write the Blanchard-Yaari equation as follows: 
(36) r* = P+
 T*L r) • 
We see from (36) that since the permanent tax cut leaves unit cost unchanged 
and q/cs unchanged, if F were initially zero, it remains at zero. Hence the 
permanent wage income tax cut leaves the natural rate of unemployment 
permanently lower in the long run. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
Much effort in open-economy macroeconomics in the past three decades 
or so has been directed at providing better microfoundations for the Mundell-
Fleming model. Two prominent papers here are the celebrated Dornbusch 
exchange-rate overshooting model (Dornbusch, 1976), which replaced static 
expectations of the exchange rate with rational expectations, and the Obstfeld-
Rogoff Redux model (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995), which provided better mi-
crofoundations by introducing imperfect competition and nominal rigidities 
into a dynamic general equilibrium model.17 As noted by Rose (2000) and 
Dornbusch (2000), however, there are very small differences between the 
results of the fortified models and the original model, a point often acknowl-
edged by the authors themselves, who are "at pains to show how little their 
work diverges from the predictions of Mundell and Fleming" (Rose, 2000, p. 
17The recent survey of open-economy macroeconomics by Lane (2001) suggests that 
research in the past few years has mainly aimed at bringing further refinements to the 
Obstfeld-Rogoff Redux model. 
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218). Consequently, the effects of three major shocks of the past few decades 
are no better described by the second-generation models than by the original 
version. 
Structuralist models such as the one here provide an altogether different 
paradigm for thinking about problems in open-economy macroeconomics. 
Even if the standard assumptions are made—perfect international capital 
mobility, rational expectations, prominence of demands and a Q theory of 
investments—the propagation mechanism through which shocks work their 
effects requires a fundamental shift in mindset. When we bring in trading 
frictions in the goods market (Phelps and Winter, 1970 and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 2000), the shifts in demands, such as shifts in consumer demand and 
shifts in government purchase of labor or the consumption good, have strong 
employment effects but they work via supply effects of the real interest rate 
and business asset prices. The path of the natural rate of unemployment 
is displaced as a result. The shocks also disturb the equilibrium path of 
the real exchange rate as trading frictions in the goods market lead to a 
deviation from the Law of One Price in the short to medium run. The 
structuralist model is analytically more complex, as the dimensionality of the 
problem increases with the addition of new state variables, and asymmetric 
information problems plague the labor market, so future research may require 
carefully devised calibration techniques. Yet, we believe that the gain in 
economic insight from further development of the structuralist approach is 
huge. 
Notwithstanding the increased complexity of our analysis, we suggest that 
the essence of the model's predictions of the responses to the major shocks 
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of the past few decades can be conveyed intuitively. Consider the shock 
experienced in the U.S. in the second half of the '90s, which we liken to the 
sudden expectation of a future surge in productivity. In our theory, this 
anticipation causes a boom in the stock market, which drives up consumer 
demand and domestic interest rate. An incipient capital inflow leads to 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a worsening trade balance. 
Because domestic firms then face stiffer competition from foreign suppliers, 
they are induced to reduce their markups, and consequently expand output 
and employment. On top of this, the increased valuation of business assets 
means that profits from future customers are high so that each firm lowers 
its current price and increases supply. The resulting economic boom is non-
inflationary. Our theory also suggests that fiscal shocks—in the form of 
tax changes and welfare entitlements—have first-order effects on the supply 
side. The Kennedy permanent income tax cut produced an expansion of 
employment without any real appreciation largely because the wage-incentive 
effect on workers' behavior increased employment and hence output to match 
the increased consumption stimulated by the tax cut. The increase in the 
external real interest rate in the '80s facing the European economies caused 
an outflow of capital and brought about a real exchange rate depreciation 
there. Being shielded from foreign competition, European firms raised their 
markups and cut back supplies, consequently contracting employment. 
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Figure 1: Response to anticipated future step-increase in Λ 














Figure 2: Response to anticipated future step-increase in Λ 
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